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Clause,"' and now they may under Flast. Many of the types of aid previously
provided by legislatures with impunity may now be subject to attack.
A substantial barrier remains in the path of increased aid which is theo-
retically unaffected by Allen. Almost every state has a constitutional provi-
sion prohibiting the "establishment of religion," many of which are stricter
than the United States Constitution. 7 And state courts acting under their
own constitutions have prohibited aid to parochial schools by striking down
such legislation, even though approved by the Supreme Court as not violative
of the first amendment.
8
Having made the transition from police and fire protection to bus fares
and books, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court in the face of post-Flast
opposition will invalidate state legislative efforts even beyond books. And the
states themselves, more closely attuned to the apparent need, coupled with
the growing realization that these schools could be forced to cease operation,
will follow the lead of the Supreme Court and relieve the strictures exerted
by state constitutions. 9 The question is no longer if, but how far, and it is
a much shorter step from books to buildings than it was from buses to books.
Thomas Coffey
96 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
97 See Note, 50 YALE L.J. 917 (1941). See generally ANTIEUA CARROLL & BURKE,
RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTION 173-239 (1965).
98 Most states in which the issue was considered rejected the theory. See Note, 17
CATH. U.L. REV. 242 (1967). See also McKenna, The Transportation of Private and
Parochial School Children at Public Expense, 35 Tr.P. L.Q. 259 (1962) for a broad
coverage of cases forbidding aid under state constitutions.
99 The leading case prohibiting state lending of textbooks is Judd v. Board of Educ.,
278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938). This decision was accepted by the courts of
several states. See, e.g., Gurney v. Fergeson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d 1002 (1941);
Mitchell v. Consol. School Dist., 17 Wash.2d 61, 135 P.2d 79 (1943); Matthews v.
Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961). Possibly indicating the beginning of a trend at
the state court level, Judd was overruled by Board of Educ. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109,
228 N.E.2d 791 (1967).
CRIMINAL LAW-BORDER SEARCHES-REQUIRING A
"CLEARER INDICATION" IN ALLOWING INTRUSIVE
BODY SEARCHES
On March 13, 1966, Oscar John Huguez and a companion traveled by auto-
mobile from Tijuana, Mexico, to San Ysidro, California, where they were
stopped by United States customs officials for routine border questioning.
During this questioning, Inspector Teela became suspicious, because of the
unnatural appearance of the two men's eyes, that they were under the influ-
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ence of narcotics. Neither Huguez nor his companion registered as a narcotic
addict or user under 18 U.S.C. § 1407.1
Teela's suspicion prompted him to conduct a strip and skin search with
the help of another agent. No contraband was discovered, but the agents
observed needle marks on both men's arms and Teela noticed a "greasy sub-
stance" on Huguez' buttocks. Following the strip and skin search, the two
men were turned over to the assistant customs agent-in-charge, who took
them to a room equipped with an examination table, which served as a
doctor's office.
Although Huguez objected and physically resisted, he was forced to sub-
mit to a digital examination of his rectum by the physician. Four packets
containing approximately four ounces of heroin were removed from the
rectal cavity. The heroin was subsequently introduced into evidence, over
Huguez' objection, when he was brought to trial in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of California on May 26, 1966. Upon con-
viction of violating 21 U.S.C. § 174,2 Huguez appealed, specifying as error
the denial of his motion to suppress the use of the heroin in evidence because
it had been unlawfully seized.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed the decision of the District Court on the ground that the appellant's
rights under both the fourth3 and fifth amendments4 had been violated.
Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968).
The search of body cavities by federal agents to obtain evidence of crimi-
nal activities is a comparatively recent development. In 1949, a federal district
court refused to convict a narcotics violator where the prosecution's primary
1 18 U.S.C. § 1407 (1965): "[N]o citizen of the United States who is addicted to or uses
narcotic drugs, as defined in section 4731 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
amended (except a person using such narcotic drugs as a result of sickness or accident or
injury to whom such narcotic drug is being furnished ... by a duly licensed physician .. )
... shall depart from or enter into or attempt to depart from or enter into the United
States, unless such person registers . . .with a customs official, agent, or employee at a
point of entry or a border customs station."
2 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1965): "Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings any
narcotic drug into the United States or any territory under its control or jurisdiction,
contrary to law, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the trans-
portation, concealment, or sale of any such narcotic drug after being imported or brought
in, knowing the same to have been imported or brought into the United States contrary
to law, or conspires to commit any of such acts in violation of the laws of the United
States, shall be imprisoned not less than five or more than twenty years and, in addition,
may be fined not more than $20,000."
3 U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
4 U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall be .... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."
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evidence was obtained by forcing the defendant to submit to having his
stomach pumped. In holding the search to be unreasonable, the court said:
The circumstances surrounding the search which disclosed the narcotics are most
unusual, and we can find only one instance in the reported cases where evidence
procured from the stomach of the defendant was offered in a court of the United
States. We can find, in no reported case, nor have we ever heard before, that an
officer acting under the authority of the United States government, and sworn to
uphold the Constitution, including the Fourth Amendment, has participated in a
search such as this.5
Since 1949, however, searches which invaded the body of the suspect have
recurred, and the courts have taken a more tolerant view of them. In the
1957 case of Breithaupt v. Abram,6 the defendant, while driving a truck,
had an accident that resulted in the death of three people. While he was
still .unconscious following the accident, a sample of his blood was taken
and it showed him to be drunk. The Supreme Court affirmed a conviction
of involuntary manslaughter, holding that there was nothing "brutal or
offensive" in the taking of the blood sample. The Court further stated,
"[m]odern community living requires modern scientific methods of crime
detection lest the public go unprotected."'7
A more recent Supreme Court case is Schmerber v. California.8 This case
also involved a blood test following an accident; but there the petitioner was
conscious and objected to the blood sample being taken. The Court held
that the petitioner's constitutional rights had not been violated and, with
particular reference to the fourth amendment, stated, ". . the Fourth
Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as
such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or
which are made in an improper manner."9
The above three cases, while similar to Huguez in that they involve
searches which intrude into the body, differ from Huguez in one important
aspect. Willis, Breithaupt, and Schmerber involved searches conducted well
within the boundaries of the United States; Huguez involved a search in-
cident to a border crossing.
Border searches have been recognized as a separate and distinct category
in the broad area of search and seizure in countless decisions.10 To conduct
a search away from the border, a police officer must first procure a warrant
5 United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745, 747 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
6352 U.S. 432 (1957).
7 Id. at 439.
8384 U.S. 757 (1966).
9 Id. at 768.
10 See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925); Landau v, Und~n States, 82 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1936); United States v.
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upon a showing of probable cause." An exception to this requirement is
where the search is incident to a lawful arrest.12 To conduct a search at the
border, however, a customs agent need not acquire a warrant, 13 make an
arrest,14 have probable cause to believe that a crime is being committed,' 5
nor, in some instances, have any suspicions. 16
The type of border search which requires no suspicion on the part of the
border official is that with which most people are familiar: the search of
baggage and vehicles of persons who enter the United States from another
country. It has been allowed since 179917 and is permissible any time a
person crosses the border.' 8 This right of customs agents to search baggage
and vehicles has been described as a right exercised by the government in ex-
change for which it grants individuals the privilege of entering the country.'5
If the official wants to extend the search beyond the baggage and vehicle
of a traveler to the personal clothing and skin of the person, then there
must be some suspicion of the one to be searched to avoid a violation of the
person's rights.
20
The more intensive a search becomes, the more delicate becomes the
Yee Ngee How, 105 F. Supp. 517 (S.D. Cal. 1952); Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389
(9th Cir. 1961) ; Denton v. United States, 310 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1962).
11 Probable cause is said to exist when "the facts and circumstances within their
[officers making search] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief" that an offense has been or is being committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 162 (1925),
12 See, e.g., Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964). Arresting officers are
allowed to search without a warrant to discover weapons and to prevent the destruction
of evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made.
13 Landau v. United States, 82 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1936); United States v. Yee Ngee
How, 105 F. Supp. 517 (S.D. Cal. 1952); United States v. Rodriguez, 195 F. Supp. 513
(D. Tex. 1960) ; Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967).
14 Landau v. United States, 82 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1936); United States v. Yee Ngee
How, 105 F. Supp. 517 (S.D. Cal. 1952) ; Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir.
1966) (Appellant was arrested, but the search made was not incidental to the arrest).
15 Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960); Plazola v. United States, 291
F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Mansfield v. United States, 308 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Marsh
v. United States, 344 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1965); King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814
(9th Cir. 1965) ; Morales v. United States, 378 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Thomas v.
United States, 372 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967).
16 Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967).
17 Act of Mar. 2, 1799, 1 Stat. 661.
18 Supra note 16, at 808.
19 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
20 Supra note 16, at 808: "If, however, the search of the person is to go further, if
the party . . . is to be required to strip, we think that something more, at least a real
suspicion, directed specifically to that person, should be required."
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balance between the necessity of conducting the search and the right of the
individual to be free from unreasonable invasions of his privacy. The most
intensive type of border search is that with which the Huguez court had to
deal: the search of a body cavity. The courts recognize the necessity of
allowing border officials to conduct intrusive searches of the body because
of the frequency with which narcotics smugglers use their bodies as reposi-
tories for contraband.2 1 At the same time, the fact cannot be ignored that
such a search is an invasion of privacy and subjects the individual searched
to a loss of dignity.
In recent years, Courts of Appeals in both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
have been confronted with a growing number of cases attacking the con-
stitutionality of body cavity searches conducted under the authority granted
to customs agents. 22 The rectal cavity is the part of the body most often
used for smuggling purposes, 23 but a number of cases where narcotics have
been recovered from the suspect's stomach have also been reported. 24 Both
types of search have been upheld as lawful border searches.
In upholding these searches, the courts have been influenced in part by
the very broad scope traditionally ascribed to border searches along with the
difficulty inherent in policing the border,25 and in part by the seriousness
of the problem created by narcotics smuggling.26 This is not to say, how-
ever, that the courts have complacently endorsed indiscriminate invasions
of travelers' bodies by agents in search of contraband. There have been
vigorous dissents to some decisions upholding such searches 27 as well as
expressions of concern for the protection of innocent travelers in the majority
opinions.28
21 Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Denton v. United States,
310 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966);
Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966); Henderson v. United States, 390
F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967).
22 See, e.g., King v. United States, 258 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1958) and Rivas v. United
States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966).
23 Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14, 15 (9th Cir. 1960).
24 United States v. Michel, 158 F. Supp. 34 (D. Tex. 1957); King v. United States,
258 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1958); Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963);
Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
25 Landau v. United States, 82 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1936) ; United States v. Rodriguez,
195 F. Supp. 513 (D. Tex. 1960); King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1965);
Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1966) ; Morales v. United States, 378
F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967).
26 Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Blefare v. United States,
362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966) ; Rivas v. United States, 369 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966).
27 Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Blefare v. United States,
362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
28 See, e.g., United States v. Michel, 158 F. Supp. 34 (D. Tex. 1957).
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Unfortunately, while the courts have struggled with the problem, they
have been unable to come up with a clearcut and simple rule to control
intrusive body searches at the border comparable to the "no suspicion re-
quired" rule for baggage and vehicle searches or the "mere suspicion" rule
for strip and skin searches. The problem does not lend itself to a simple
solution.
Blackford v. United States29 was the first case involving a body cavity
search at a border crossing to come up on appeal from a district court. The
court expressed little doubt that customs officials had the authority to force
the petitioner to submit to a rectal probe performed by a physician; remov-
ing narcotics from body cavities was deemed analogous to forcing a person
with contraband in a clenched fist to open his hand.30
The question of degree of suspicion necessary to intiate the search was
not an issue because Blackford had already been arrested and had informed
the agents of the heroin secreted in his rectum before the search was made.
The primary issue, then, was the reasonableness of the conduct of the offi-
cers. The test of reasonableness that must be applied, the court held, was a
stricter test than that applied to state proceedings under the Due Process
Clause of the fourteenth amendment:
There may be, we conceive, conduct which, while unreasonable, is not so un-
conscionable that it "shocks the conscience" . . . . On the other hand, if conduct
is reasonable, it must perforce satisfy Due Process requirements. Accordingly, if
the actions here questioned were reasonable, they did not constitute a violation
of either the Fourth or Fifth Amendments.31
Thus the Black ford court assured the suspected narcotics smuggler of a
constitutional protection somewhat broader than that provided by the "vague
contours of the Due Process Clause," which, according to the Supreme Court,
"precludes defining. ' 32
Following Blackford, the standard of reasonableness, which itself "pre-
cludes defining,"3 3 has been consistently applied by the courts in cases in-
volving invasion of body cavities during border searches. In Lane v. United
States,34 the court held, "Administering emetics to cause vomiting in order
29 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957).
30 d. at 753.
31 1d. at 750-51.
32 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952).
3 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950): "What is a reasonable search
is not to be determined by any fixed formula. The Constitution does not define what are
,unreasonable' searches and, regrettably, in our discipline we have no ready litmus-paper
test. The recurring questions of the reasonableness of searches must find resolution in the
facts and circumstances of each case."
34 321 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963).
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to recover narcotics is not an unreasonable search of the person." 35 Also in
Denton v. United States,"6 which involved a rectal probe, the court stated,
"Nowhere during the entire search and examinations, to and including re-
covery of the evidence, do we find anything unreasonable under the circum-
stances. .. . 37
Still the question of degree of suspicion necessary to initiate a body cavity
search was not answered, the courts emphasizing simply that probable cause
was not required.3 8 As recently as 1966, when Blefare v. United States39 was
decided, Judge Ely pointed out in his dissenting opinion, "Since, as a general
rule, neither a warrant nor the existence of probable cause is a necessary
prerequisite for a border search, suspicion alone might legally justify the
'stomach pumping'. .. .
Later the same year, however, Rivas v. United States41 firmly disposed of
the idea that a body cavity search could legally be initiated at the border
if based on mere suspicion. "Thus we need not hold the search of any body
cavity is justified merely because it is a border search, and nothing more.
There must exist facts creating a clear indication, or plain suggestion, of
the smuggling.
'42
It should be noted that, while the Rivas court imposed stricter standards
upon border officials to control initiation of a body cavity search, they none-
theless found that the search of the appellant's rectum was not unreasonable,
and affirmed his conviction. The combined facts that Rivas was a registered
user of narcotics and was under the influence of narcotics when he crossed
the border created the necessary "clear indication."
Henderson v. United States43 reaffirmed the "clear indication" or "plain
suggestion" standard adopted by the court in Rivas. Henderson involved a
vaginal probe which revealed a hidden packet of heroin, on the evidence of
which the appellant was convicted of a narcotics violation. The case differed
from Rivas in that the customs agent had no information about the appellant.
She was not under the influence of narcotics, and she had no needle marks
on her arms. On appeal, the court determined that the search had been
35Id. at .576.
36310 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1962).
37 Id. at 133.
8 See, e.g., Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960).
39362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
40 Id. at 886.
41368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966).
421d. at 710.
48 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967).
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initiated on mere suspicion and, therefore, had been conducted in violation
of the appellant's fourth amendment rights.
It was in reliance upon Rivas, Henderson, and the non-border case of
Schmerber v. California44 that Huguez was decided. Here the court held that
there was not sufficient "clear indication" that the appellant was concealing
narcotics within his body to justify the rectal examination performed. This
in spite of the fact that the agents and the doctor were of the opinion that
Huguez was under the influence of narcotics, 45 and the fact that the court
had previously taken judicial notice of the great danger that "there will be
attempts to smuggle such drugs into the country every time an addict or user
crosses the boundary line."'46 In addition, preliminary searches had eliminated
the possibility that any narcotics that Huguez might have were secreted in
his car, in his clothing, or on his body.
This decision represents a shift in judicial thinking as regards border
searches. In the familiar problem of balancing the interests of society against
the interests of the individual, there can be little doubt that the current
trend in judicial reasoning generally is to favor the latter over the former.
The trend has now encompassed the border search. In prior decisions can
be found the recurrent theme that the privacy and dignity of an individual
has not really been compromised by an intrusive search when the person
searched chose to degrade himself by using his body as a repository for
narcotics.47 Such an idea is not even mentioned in Huguez. Rather, the
court held that there was "a brutal invasion of privacy. '48
The "brutal invasion" that the appellant was subjected to here is generally
regarded as the least objectionable of the bodily invasions. In Rivas the
majority stated, "the physical assault, the 'gentle' probing of the rectum,
was not as pronounced an assault, medically, as the puncture of the skin in
Breithaupt. . .. -4" And in United States v. Michel50 the court indicated
44384 U.S. 757 (1966).
45 Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366, 371 (9th Cir. 1968).
46 Reyes v. United States, 258 F.2d 774, 785 (9th Cir. 1958).
47 Blackford v. United States, supra note 29, at 754 (Chambers, J., concurring):
"[T]he Supreme Court's policy is to uphold human dignity.... But here it was Blackford
[the defendant] who created, who first takes us into this disgusting sequence. . . .I
do not say that the depraved have no rights. But I do say that to my sensibilities all of
the shockingness was Blackford's." Blefare v. United States, supra note 21, at 878: "It
does not shock my conscience to require a defendant to do, under careful medical super-
vision, that which defendant himself willingly and knowingly proposed to do, without
medical supervision, for his own selfish pleasure or profit. . .
48 Huguez v. United States, supra note 45, at 379.
49 Rivas v. United States, supra note 14, at 711.
50 158 F. Supp. 34 (D. Tex. 1957).
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that the extraction of the stomach's contents is regarded as more extreme
than a rectal probe by posing the question, "Is the narcotic subject to seizure
if secreted within two inches of the anus, but secure and exempt if per-
chance the smuggler may lodge it at a greater distance within his intestine,
or may retain it in his stomach until he has passed the inspection station?"'"
Even Chief Justice Warren's very restrictive language in his dissenting
opinion to Breithaupt, which at least one writer has interpreted to mean
absolute proscription of any intrusion into the body,52 literally taken, would
allow the examination of a suspect's rectal cavity. The Chief Justice's opinion
was in part, "at least that law-enforcement officers in their efforts to obtain
evidence from persons suspected of crime must stop short of bruising the
body, breaking the skin, puncturing tissue or extracting body fluids, whether
they contemplate doing it by force or by stealth. '53
Obviously, a stomach pumping procedure, which extracts body fluids; and
the taking of blood, which, in addition to extracting body fluids, breaks the
skin, should, in Chief Justice Warren's opinion, be prohibited.
On the other hand, a properly conducted rectal probe neither bruises the
body, breaks the skin, punctures tissue, nor extracts body fluids. Of course,
the Huguez court did not prohibit searches of rectal cavities under all cir-
cumstances. However, it is of some significance that the search was held to
be unreasonable although the medical procedure was a relatively simple one
and the agents responsible for the search had at least some reason to believe
that the appellant had secreted narcotics in his rectum.5 4
If the emphasis on the individual's right to privacy and uncompromised
dignity continues, as seems likely, the next logical step by the courts will
be to require a search warrant to authorize an intrusive body search at the
border. The possibility of such a requirement was mentioned in earlier
cases 55 but did not receive much attention until Blefare was decided. In his
dissenting opinion to that case, Judge Ely asserted that when time permits
the obtaining of a warrant, and an extreme search procedure is commenced
without authority therefore having been sought of a magistrate, the search is
unreasonable.56 This is the position that he reiterated in his concurring opin-
ion in Huguez, and the position that has been adopted by other writers in
the legal field.5 7
51 Id. at 37.
52 Comment, Intrusive Border Searches-Is Judicial Control Desirable?, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 276 (1966).
53 Breithaupt v. Abram, supra note 6, at 441.
54 Huguez v. United States, supra note 45 (see dissenting opinion).
55 See United States v. Michel, supra note 24; Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573
(5th Cir. 1963).
56 Blefare v. United States, supra note 39, at 887.
5 7 See, e.g., 77 YALE L.J. 1007 (1968); 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 513 (1967); Comment,
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Some of the difficulties that would be involved should the courts follow
Judge Ely's recommendation were suggested by the majority opinion in Rivas
when it set up the requirement of "clear indication" as opposed to mere
suspicion as grounds for a body cavity search.
If the government cannot search bodily cavities on bare suspicion, may it not
on the basis of a reasonably clear indication? If the government has no basis to
search on a clear indication, obviously it can have no reasonable cause to arrest.
If the government cannot arrest, and must pursue the suspected individual, how
far must it follow him, and when arrest? A thousand difficult problems are
created.58
Camara v. United States5 9 offers the proposition that the necessity of
obtaining a warrant before conducting a search "depends in part upon
whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the gov-
ernmental purpose behind the search." 60 If the governmental purpose is
likely to be frustrated anywhere by the requirement of a warrant, it is likely
to be frustrated at the border. If the facts in Huguez did not create even a
"clear indication" of smuggling, what, then, would be necessary to establish
probable cause? Counsel for the appellee suggest that probable cause in
this type of case will rarely ever be established in the absence of a con-
fession by the smuggler or a conspirator.6 '
Marsh v. United States60- makes the unique statement that, "if the
customs agents had any reason, even though not ordinarily measuring up
to 'probable cause,' it might, under all of the circumstances, suffice to meet
the constitutional test of reasonableness and amount to probable cause."63
This is, in effect, taking facts that amount to a "clear indication" and
attaching to them the appellation of "probable cause." In other words, if
a warrant is to be required for border searches, then it should be obtainable
on a showing of something less than probable cause. However, the advocates
of requiring a warrant to initiate an intrusive body search make no men-
tion of a deviation from the normally required probable cause to obtain it.
Intrusive Border Searches-Is Judicial Control Desirable?, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 276, 283
(1966): "The requirement of a hearing before an impartial judicial officer, as in an
application for a warrant to search a building, further protects this privacy by increasing
the accuracy of the determination of whether there is probable cause to search. When it
has been adjudged that it is probable that a citizen is engaged in criminal activity, then
the interest of society in law enforcement outweighs the interest in preserving the privacy
of the suspect, and it is 'reasonable' to make the search."
58 Rivas v. United States, supra note 14, at 711.
59387 U.S. 523 (1967).
60 Id. at 533.
61 Brief of Appellee, Huguez v. United States, supra note 45.
62 344 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1965).
63 Id. at 324.
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In reversing Huguez' conviction, the court, by relying upon the standards
set out in Rivas, Henderson, and Schmerber, left the imposition of a require-
ment of a search warrant, if it is to be required, up to some future court.
It will be interesting to see how future decisions deal with the issue. One
thing seems reasonably clear; the matter will be determined at the appeals
court level. In the past, as applications for certiorari in cases involving body
cavity searches at the border came up before the Supreme Court, they were
consistently denied.64
While the court in Huguez elected not to make a search warrant a legal
prerequisite to a medical examination of a body cavity as part of a border
search, it went further than any prior decision in restricting what is con-
sidered reasonable in the initiation of the search. According to this decision,
even the physician who performs the medical examination must possess in-
formation amounting to a "clear indication" or "plain suggestion" that the
suspect has hidden contraband in his body.6 After stating that Agents
Gates and Maxcy "did not and could not" have passed on to Dr. Salerno
any information that they had about the appellant, the court concluded:
Without a search warrant, without any "clear indication" or "plain suggestion"
that Huguez carried narcotics in his rectal cavity, and in fact without the slightest
real suspicion of any such rectal cavity cache, Dr. Salerno proceeded to conduct
the examination on his own initiative without any request or suggestion that he
do so, but with the aid of the three customs agents-Gates, Maxcy and Spohr. 66
In none of the other cases cited in this note was the knowledge, or lack
of knowledge, on the part of the physician who performed the examination
mentioned. However, in the non-border case of Lustig v. United States6 7 the
Court made it clear that it is the conduct of federal agents, and not the
conduct of someone else whose help is enlisted, that is determinative of the
reasonableness of a search. There the Court stated, "[A] search is a search
by a federal official if he had a hand in it. . . . It is immaterial whether
a federal agent originated the idea or joined in it while the search was in
progress. So long as he was in it before the object of the search was com-
pletely accomplished, he must be deemed to have participated in it." 68 In
64 Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914
(1958); King v. United States, 258 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 939
(1959); Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 977
(1961); Bible v. United States, 314 F.2d 106 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 862
(1963); Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 936
(1964).
65 Huguez v. United States, supra note 45, at 20.
66 Huguez v. United States, supra note 45, at 20-21.
67338 U.S. 74 (1949).
68 Id. at 78-79.
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Iluguez, there is no doubt that the customs agents participated in the search.
Furthermore, it is completely reasonable for the doctor to have assumed
that the appellant was brought to the examination room for the purpose of
a medical examination being performed. That, obviously, was the sole reason
for the doctor's presence at the border station.
Finally, the emphasis placed upon the amount of force exerted on the
appellant bears mentioning. Although Judge Barnes, in dissenting, insisted
that no more force than was necessary to complete the search was involveda!,
the majority held that the search was conducted in an unreasonable manner
in addition to being initiated unreasonably. 70 In almost all searches of this
type, some force is necessary. 71 It seems highly unlikely that a suspect would
willingly allow the contraband he is smuggling to be discovered by customs
agents if there is any possibility of preventing the discovery.
Huguez is distinguished from Blefare in that Blefare willingly submitted
to a rectal probe by a physician while Huguez resisted and had to be re-
strained by three customs agents before the examination could be com-
pleted. 72 However, it is significant that Blefare had not concealed the
narcotics he possessed in his rectal cavity, but in his stomach. He did object
to and resist the insertion of a tube into his stomach to induce vomiting.
In spite of his resistance, he, too, was restrained by customs officials while
the physician inserted the tube. Blefare's conviction was affirmed on appeal;
the court found no violation of his fifth amendment rights.7 3
While it is well settled that a search conducted in an unlawful manner
is not made lawful by the evidence discovered, 74 the courts have also em-
phasized that a premium should not be put on the suspect's resistance.7'
A search is not unlawful simply because some force had to be employed to
effectuate it. Such an idea was firmly rejected in Henderson, the last intrusive
search case decided in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit before
Huguez. "This court has repeatedly upheld border searches of body cavities,
69 Huguez v. United States, supra note 45, at 43.
70 Huguez v. United States, supra note 45, at 26.
71 In United States v. Michel, supra note 24, at 37, the court said, "Where the
smuggler so degrades himself as to secret the contraband in this fashion, the law is not
powerless to cope with such tactics. The Fourth Amendment does not prevent its re-
covery because the hiding place is difficult of access or because its recovery causes some
discomfort to him who placed it there." And in Lane v. United States, supra note 34, at
576, the court said, "Lack of force is not controlling. ..
72 Huguez v. United States, supra note 45, at 23.
73 Blefare v. United States, supra note 21.
74 Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 30 (1926); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10, 16-17 (1947) ; United States V. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 9S (1948).
75 United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 378, 387 (D.D.C. 1957).
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including such searches carried out in spite of the violent resistance of the
person searched."
'76
The total effect of the Huguez decision is one of tighter restrictions on
border officials in the area of body cavity searches. Not only will the customs
agents have to show substantial evidence to back up the initiation of any
such search in the future, but they will have to handle the suspect in an
extremely gentle manner. Also, the agents will have to take more care to
pass on all information and suspicions they have to the physician before he
attempts any medical examination.
Whether this will result in additional protection for innocent travelers
or simply in the reversal of more narcotics convictions remains to be seen.
That the rule of exclusion and reversal results in the escape of guilty persons is
more capable of demonstration than that it deters invasions of right by the
police. . . . Rejection of the evidence does nothing to punish the wrong-doing
official, while it may, and likely will, release the wrong-doing defendant. . . . It
protects one against whom incriminating evidence is discovered, but does nothing
to protect innocent persons who are the victims of illegal but fruitless searches. 77
Janetta Fowler
76 Henderson v. United States, supra note 16, at 806-07.
77 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1953).
CRIMINAL LAW-GUIDELINES FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY IN
THE INSANITY DEFENSE-MAKING THE
"PRODUCT" PALPABLE
A jury convicted Thomas Washington, appellant, of rape, robbery and
assault with a deadly weapon. The principal defense was insanity. The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that
sufficient evidence had been adduced to preclude a directed verdict. However,
the court went on to criticize the quality of the evidence and wrote a model
instruction setting forth guidelines for future testimony by expert witnesses
on the insanity defense in criminal prosecutions. Washington v. United States,
390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
The Washington case presents an interesting intertwining of criminal law
substantive and evidentiary issues. The general scope of the opinion en-
compasses the insanity defense to criminal responsibility. Specifically, Chief
Judge Bazelon, who wrote the opinion of the court, adjudged the role of
psychiatric expert opinion testimony. But equally noteworthy are the impli-
cations of his expositive opinion, which typify the struggle courts are having
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